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David I Summary
ABCNEWS' JOHN NANCE at 8:26 p.m. ET
When notification of a hijacking or possible hijacking rumbles through the air traffic control system, it becomes a general alert and is tracked not only at the local facility, such as an air route traffic control center, but is also tracked and coordinated at the Herndon, Virginia facility that is the master control center for the entire air traffic control system (like mission control at NASA).

 

CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT

CHIEFS OF STAFF

INSTRUCTION

Enclosure A

A-2

c. Military Escort Aircraft

(1) When notified that military escort aircraft are needed in

conjunction with an aircraft piracy (hijacking) emergency, the DDO,

NMCC, will notify the appropriate unified command or USELEMNORAD to

determine if suitable aircraft are available and forward the request to the

Secretary of Defense for approval in accordance with DODD 3025.15,

paragraph D.7 (reference d).

(2) Pursuant to reference j, the escort service will be requested by

the FAA hijack coordinator by direct contact with the NMCC. Normally,

NORAD escort aircraft will take the required action. However, for the

purpose of these procedures, the term "escort aircraft" applies to any

military aircraft assigned to the escort mission. When the military can

provide escort aircraft, the NMCC will advise the FAA hijack coordinator of

the identification and location of the squadron tasked to provide escort

aircraft. NMCC will then authorize direct coordination between FAA and

the designated military unit. When a NORAD resource is tasked, FAA will

coordinate through the appropriate Air Defense Sector/Regional Air

Operations Center.

The FAA has a detailed hijacking manual: Supervisors are notified. The FAA command center near Washington and the FBI are put on alert. Military jets are scrambled to follow the plane. Air-traffic controllers try to figure out where the hijacker wants to go and, if necessary, clear an air space of other traffic.

If it fails, an emergency is declared and all air space in the area is secured. In the course of such an emergency, procedures are followed to determine whether the airplane was hijacked or out of control. Because the time factor is so crucial, these emergency procedures are well defined and exercised, to be implemented as rapidly as possible. In certain emergencies, especially hijacking, US military resources are drawn on as a matter of routine. 

Military jets are routinely scrambled in the case of hijackings and ``runners,'' planes that do not answer or do not heed air traffic controllers. But FAA officials would not say when controllers detected the errant Flight 77 or whether any fighter jets were able to get into the air to confront it.


Chapter 7. ESCORT OF HIJACKED AIRCRAFT

Section 1. GENERAL

7-1-1. PURPOSE

The FAA hijack coordinator (the Director or his designate of the FAA Office of Civil Aviation Security) on duty at Washington headquarters will request the military to provide an escort aircraft for a confirmed hijacked aircraft to:

a. Assure positive flight following.

b. Report unusual observances.

c. Aid search and rescue in the event of an emergency.

7-1-2. REQUESTS FOR SERVICE

The escort service will be requested by the FAA hijack coordinator by direct contact with the National Military Command Center (NMCC).  Normally, NORAD escort aircraft will take the required action.  However, for the purpose of these procedures, the term "escort aircraft" applies to any military aircraft assigned to the escort mission.  When the military can provide escort aircraft, the NMCC will advise the FAA hijack coordinator the identification and location of the squadron tasked to provide escort aircraft.  NMCC will then authorize direct coordination between FAA and the designated military unit.  When a NORAD resource is tasked, FAA will coordinate through the appropriate SOCC/ROCC.

7-1-3. HANDLING PRIORITY

When the situation requires an expedited departure of the escort aircraft, the aircraft shall be afforded priority consideration over other departing aircraft.

7-1-4. CONTROL RESPONSIBILITIES FOR U.S. AIRSPACE

a. When hijacked aircraft is within FAA radar coverage, escort aircraft shall be controlled by the appropriate FAA facility.

b. When a hijacked aircraft is not within FAA radar coverage but within military radar coverage, escort aircraft may be controlled by the military for the escort phase only.

c. When escort aircraft are under military control, separation between the escort aircraft/hijacked aircraft and other IFR traffic is the responsibility of the FAA.  Separation shall be provided through the application of appropriate altitude reservations as required.

d. When escort aircraft is under FAA control, standard air traffic control separation shall be applied.  In no case shall any clearance or instruction to the aircraft compromise ATC standards.

e. When tanker aircraft are employed, the designated tankers and escort aircraft shall be under FAA control, and appropriate aerial refueling procedures shall apply.

 

7-4-2. POSITION REPORTS WITHIN NORAD RADAR COVERAGE

When the hijacking activity is within coverage of the NORAD surveillance system, position
reports will be forwarded to the Cheyenne Mountain AFB/Air Defense Operations Center (CMAFB/ADOC) by NORAD units.

9-2-1. GENERAL

EN ROUTE

a. All flight movement data on the aircraft listed in subparas 1 and 2 below shall be immediately brought to the attention of the supervisory traffic management coordinator-in-charge and forwarded by the most expeditious means (voice, if possible) to the senior director at the concerned NORAD Region Operations Control Center/Sector Operations Control Center and to the Air Traffic Control System Command Center (ATCSCC). Voice messages will be followed up with a data communication message when directed. All flight plans on aircraft listed in subparas 1 and 2 below, including flights within the continental U.S., shall be retransmitted by data communication to ATT-200 and the Office of International Aviation, attention: AIA-101.

4-7-7. ACTIVE SCRAMBLES

Provide maximum assistance to expedite the movement of interceptors on active air defense missions until the unknown aircraft is identified.

a. The ADCF initiating the scramble shall identify the mission as an active air defense mission.

b. ATC services shall be used for active air defense missions insofar as the circumstances permit.

c. Upon request, ATC facilities shall expedite transfer of responsibility of the interceptor to the requesting ADCF.

Procedures

     a.  General.  Military personnel will provide the following types of support:  intercept, surveillance, lift, equipment and communications.  Military personnel may not participate in a search, seizure, arrest, or other similar activity.  This restriction would include the apprehension of aircraft hijackers or the use of military aircraft (fixed wing or helicopter) or other vehicles as platforms for gunfire or the use of other weapons against suspected hijackers.   In addition, assistance may not be provided under this enclosure if it could adversely affect national security or military preparedness.

     b.   Support.  When notified that military assistance is needed in conjunction with an aircraft piracy (hijacking) emergency, the DDO, NMCC, will:

     (1)  Determine whether or not the assistance needed is reasonably available form police or commercial sources.  If not, the DDO, NMCC, will notify the appropriate unified command or NORAD to determine if suitable assets are available and will forward the request to the Secretary of Defense for approval in accordance with DODD 3025.15, paragraph D.7 (reference d).

    (2)  If suitable assets from a unified command or NORAD are not reasonably available, the DDO, NMCC will coordinate with the appropriate Military Service operations center to provide military assistance.


c.  Military Escort Aircraft

   (1)  When notified that the escort aircraft are needed in conjunction with an aircraft piracy (hijacking) emergency, the DDO, NMCC, will notify the appropriate unified command or USELEMNORAD (US Element North American Aerospace Defense Command) to determine if suitable aircraft are available and forward the request to the Secretary of Defense for approval in accordance with DODD 3025.15, paragraph D.7 (reference d)

 

Here are the FAA regulations concerning hijackings:

"The FAA hijack coordinator…on duty at Washington headquarters will request the military to provide an escort aircraft for a confirmed hijacked aircraft…The escort service will be requested by the FAA hijack coordinator by direct contact with the National Military Command Center (NMCC)." (4)

Here are the instructions issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on June 1, 2001:

"In the event of a hijacking, the NMCC will be notified by the most expeditious means by the FAA. The NMCC will…forward requests for DOD assistance to the Secretary of Defense for approval." (5)

The U.S. is supposed to scramble military aircraft the moment a hijacking is confirmed

Andrews Air Force Base

is a huge installation. It hosts two > 'combat-ready' squadrons: * the 121st Fighter Squadron (FS-121) of the 113th Fighter Wing > (FW-113), equipped with F-16 fighters; *

the 321st Marine Fighter Attack Squadron (VMFA-321) of the 49th > Marine Air Group, Detachment A (MAG-49 Det-A), equipped with > F/A-18 fighters.

An Air Traffic Controller (ATC) may request military jets to intercept (or 'escort') a commercial aircraft in response to any > serious problem which the Air Traffic Controller cannot solve through  radio contact. Perhaps the most common problem is that a commercial > jet has deviated from its authorized flight path.

If a plane deviates from its flight plan, or makes the wrong turn at  one of its 'fixes,' an Air Traffic Controller (ATC) contacts the  pilot. If the ATC cannot make contact, he or she will request an  escort - that is, a military jet - to scramble and check out the  situation.

This is called 'interception.' A high-ranking FAA official - called an Air Defense Liaison Officer  (ADLO) - is stationed in the headquarters of NORAD, the North American Aerospace Defense Command. The purpose: to help the FAA and  the military work together to handle emergencies as quickly as  possible. (8) Escorts are usually scrambled from NORAD bases

"[Marine Corps Major Mike] Snyder, the NORAD spokesman, said its > fighters routinely intercept aircraft.

 

http://www.flora.org/nowar/forum/79

 

Flight 93

 

At some point, before the plane reached Cleveland, the hijackers took over the plane, armed with knives and the threat of a bomb.

Around 9:30 a.m., air-traffic controllers in Cleveland heard someone in the cockpit say, "Hey, get out of here!" according to a source close to the investigation.

Then, in what was described as a thick Arabic accent, a voice was heard that appeared to be addressing passengers, even though it was radioed to air-traffic control.

"This is your captain," the man said. "There is a bomb on board. Remain in your seats. We are returning to the airport."

How the hijackers overpowered the pilots remains unclear. One passenger would report in a telephone call that two people lay on the floor in the first-class cabin, either injured or dead. They appeared to be the pilot and co-pilot, he said, relating information from a flight attendant. Another told a friend that two people had their throats slit but didn't identify them. A third saw only one injured.

At least five passengers and flight attendants described the hijackers in their calls in similar terms: three men, wearing red bandannas, one with some sort of box strapped around his waist that he claimed was a bomb. One passenger reported that two of the hijackers were in the cockpit and a third guarded passengers in first-class from behind a curtain.

4th hijacker not seen

None of the callers mentioned a fourth hijacker, although the FBI has identified four men in connection with the hijacking.

Those men are Saeed Alghamdi, Ahmed Ibrahim A. Al Haznawi, Ahmed Alnami and Ziad Samir Jarrah.

It may be that the people who made calls were unable to see the fourth hijacker. Some news reports have suggested one may have already gained access to the cockpit, as a uniformed guest pilot sitting in the spare jump-seat. Or, some terrorism experts suggest, he may have played a role as a "back-up," perhaps remaining unidentified among the other passengers or hiding in the bathroom until he was needed.

A Justice Department spokeswoman said Friday that their "best information" shows that four were involved.

By 9:36 a.m., United Flight 93 had suddenly changed course, according to flight path information provided by Flight Explorer, a firm that supplies real-time radar tracking data, making a U-turn and heading back toward Washington.

Frantic calls begin

In the cabin, passengers frantically began making calls, 23 of them from the seat-back phones alone from 9:31 to 9:53 a.m. Others passed cell phones to people who had been strangers just minutes before.

Why so many people were able to make calls while apparently under guard by hijackers could be that, as one passenger reported, there was no hijacker among the passengers in coach.

Some of the telephone calls were short--no more than a few rushed words of fear or love.

Lauren Grandcolas, flying home to San Rafael, Calif., from her grandmother's funeral, left a message for her husband saying her flight had been hijacked but she was "comfortable, for now."

Linda Gronlund and Joe Deluca, on their way to San Francisco for a vacation together, took turns. She called her sister to say she would miss her. He called his father.

"The plane's been hijacked," he said. "I love you."

Andrew Garcia, an Air National Guard air traffic controller and plane buff, only managed to get out his wife's name, "Dorothy," before his phone went dead.

Other passengers, though, managed to conduct fairly lengthy, even repeated conversations during the plane's final minutes, constructing a jumbled puzzle of what was happening inside the Boeing 757.

Deena Burnett was feeding her three daughters breakfast and watching the news in horror when the telephone rang in her home in San Ramon, Calif.

"Are you OK?" she asked her husband, Tom, 38.

"No," he said. "I'm on the airplane and it's been hijacked."

He told his wife that the hijackers had already stabbed someone. He told her to call the authorities, and he hung up.

When he called back, she was on the line to the FBI. She told him about the World Trade Center, the first he knew of the attack. He paused. "Were they commercial airplanes?" he asked.

Deena Burnett didn't think so. Cargo or private planes, she said.

"Do you know anything else about the planes?" No, she said.

"Do you know who was involved?" Again, she said no.

He told her that the man who was stabbed had died.

The hijackers are talking about running the plane into the ground, he said. Then he said he had to go.

His third call came about 9:41 a.m., shortly after a plane had hit the Pentagon. "OK," he said. "We're going to do something."

In his fourth and final call, just before 10 a.m., Burnett said he was sure the hijackers didn't have a bomb, that he thought they only had knives.

"There's a group of us who are going to do something," he repeated.

Deena Burnett thought about her years of training as a flight attendant, where she was taught to appease hijackers, to meet their demands, to stay in the background. She told her husband to sit down. "Don't draw attention to yourself," she said.

She told him she loved him. She felt he thought he was coming home that night. This was simply a problem that he was going to solve, as he had solved many others.

Takeover plots hatching

As Burnett talked with his wife, three other men who may have joined him in whatever plans were being hatched made calls of their own.

Across the aisle in Seat 4D, Mark Bingham, 31, called his mother. He was so rattled that when Alice Hoglan got on the line, her son told her, "This is Mark Bingham."

His message was brief: The plane had been hijacked by three men and he loved her.

In the rear of the plane, Jeremy Glick, also 31, a sales manager for a Web site firm and former judo champion, called his wife from a seatback phone. He described three Middle Eastern men brandishing knives and a red box.

His wife told him about the attacks at the World Trade Center. He tried to grasp the hijackers' plans--to blow up the plane or fly it into a target?

The passengers had taken a vote among themselves, he said. They had decided to try to take back the plane.

"I told him to go ahead and do it," Lyzbeth Glick said on "Good Morning America. "I trusted his instincts, and I said, `Do what you have to do.' I knew that I thought he could do it."

Details relayed to operator

Beamer, 32, an account manager for Oracle Corp., called a stranger. He picked up a seat-back phone and hit "0," and at 9:45 a.m., he was connected first to a dispatcher for GTE Airfone, and then to Lisa Jefferson, the operator's supervisor.

For 13 minutes, Beamer told Jefferson everything he could, passing along information he gleaned himself as well as from a flight attendant. The passengers remained in their seats, she said he told her, and the flight attendants were forced to sit in the back of the plane.

He told her how much he loved his pregnant wife and two sons, and he asked her to call them. He asked her to say the Lord's Prayer and 23rd Psalm with him.

Moments later, Beamer told Jefferson about the plan, that the passengers were going to run up the long, narrow aisle to the first-class cabin and attack the hijacker there.

"I'm going to have to go out on faith," Beamer said.

He turned to someone else, and he said, "Are you ready?" Then, in the last words Jefferson would hear from him, "OK. Let's roll."

Sandra Bradshaw, the flight attendant, also identified three hijackers when she called her husband in Greensboro, N.C. She had been moved to the back of the plane, she said, but she and other passengers had a plan. They were going to rush their captors; she was boiling water to throw on them.

Another passenger, Elizabeth Wainio, also apparently talked of a plan to rush the hijackers. In a call she made to her stepmother in Baltimore, using the cell phone lent to her by Lauren Grandcolas, she said, "I've got to go now, Mom, they're breaking into the cockpit," according to the mother of another passenger, who said she spoke with family members about the call. Wainio's parents declined comment.

The accounts of these calls--if accurate--would indicate that at least four people were somehow plotting to attack the hijackers. If Beamer's report is accurate, they were seated in different sections of the plane, with Bingham and Burnett up front, while the others were in the back.

It may be there were separate plans to take the plane or that somehow, amid all the telephone calls, chaos and fear, the passengers were able to communicate with each other.

If they did, they may have known they had another pilot among them, Donald Greene, chief executive officer of Safe Flight Instrument Corp. in New York. Greene, according to his family, knew anything and everything about airplanes.

At about 9:54 a.m., the plane started flying erratically. In Oak Brook, Ill., Jefferson heard screams in the background.

Flight plan changes

Two minutes later, the plane's flight plan changed. The destination airport was changed from San Francisco International to Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport. Estimated time of arrival: 10:28 a.m.

At nearly the same moment, from the plane's bathroom, someone called 911, repeating that Flight 93 had been hijacked, that this was not a hoax.

Then, Marion Britton called a longtime friend, Fred Fiumano, at his New York City auto shop.

Britton, crying, told him the plane was turning around. It was going to go down.

"Don't worry about it," Fiumano said, trying desperately to reassure her. "They're only taking you for a ride."

He heard yelling and screaming in the background, and then the phone went dead. He tried to call the cellular phone number back, but no one answered.

A few of the passengers expected they would win the battle. Before Lyzbeth Glick turned over the phone to her father because she couldn't bear to listen anymore, her husband told her, "Hang on the line. I'll be back."

At about 10:03 a.m., a black crater bloomed in the soft earth of a field 80 miles southeast of Pittsburgh.

The wife in California, the father-in-law in New York, the operator in suburban Chicago still held onto their phones.

They held on, waiting and hoping in the silence.

Tribune reporters Douglas Holt, Naftali Bendavid and Dan Mihalopoulos contributed to this report.

Copyright © 2001, The Chicago TribuneThe Boeing 757 took several sharp turns all within about two or three minutes of each other near Weirton, halfway through the 87-minute flight, according to Flight Explorer.

Unanswered Questions About US Attacks 

09/26/2001



Consultations with numerous professional pilots and security experts, regarding the attacks of Sept. 11, have raised the following questions: 

1) How could an operation of this size and sophistication, involving up to 100 individuals, possibly go undetected? Was this a colossal 'intelligence failure,' or was the failure itself organized? 

2) How were the hijackers able to overcome the entire flight crews, without one of the pilots being able to punch a 4-digit code into the aircraft's transponder or say something on radio, to inform the Federal Aviation Agency (FAA) of the hijacking? If the hijackers might succeed in one case or two, it is amazing, if not unbelievable, that they could do so in four cases. Were the pilots who took command of the planes from the beginning, the hijackers? If so, the hijacker pilots must know the procedures used by flight crew members, which are precise and complicated, and differ from airline to airline. 

Many pilots say that a terrorist with minimal training could have conducted these maneuvers. But, what are the chances of such success by four amateurs? The former commander of the Israeli Air Force, Major General Eiten Ben Eliahu said, in an Israeli radio interview, that he believed that the pilots must have been Americans, not foreigners. The fact that the attacks had to occur during clear skies, means the operation must have had several target dates. This adds another level of complexity. 

3) Why did all emergency procedures fail? Several professional pilots have made this point, including a recent article in the Israeli daily Ha'aretz, by its military commentator. All four planes grossly deviated from their flight paths. Under FAA procedures, the moment it is detected that an aircraft has deviated from its assigned flight path, the FAA immediately tries to contact pilots. If it fails, an emergency is declared and all air space in the area is secured. In the course of such an emergency, procedures are followed to determine whether the airplane was hijacked or out of control. Because the time factor is so crucial, these emergency procedures are well defined and exercised, to be implemented as rapidly as possible. In certain emergencies, especially hijacking, US military resources are drawn on as a matter of routine. 

It has been reported that the transponders of the aircraft were turned off. This alone would trigger emergency procedures. Even if turned off, they would not disappear from the radars which would continue to track the flight path. 

American Airlines flight 11 and United Airlines flight 175, the two aircraft that hit the World Trade Center, took off from Boston's Logan Airport at 7:59 and 7:58 respectively. The former hit the World Trade Center 46 minutes later. The latter, 66 minutes later. They both grossly deviated from their assigned flight paths, especially UA 175. Under emergency conditions, this is a tremendous length of time. 

In the case of the Pentagon attack, the facts appear even more extraordinary. American Airlines flight 77 departed from Washington's Dulles airport for Los Angeles. It flew west for 40 minutes, made a U-turn and started to return to Washington, and hit the Pentagon 40 minutes later, at 9:40. 

United Airlines flight 93 took off from Newark Airport in New Jersey heading for San Francisco, made a U-turn over Cleveland, Ohio and crashed in Pennsylvania. 

The exact sequence of events over this almost 2-hour time-frame has not been made public, despite press leaks. 

Security sources have asked the question regarding the role of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), which is responsible for defending US and Canadian airspace from attack by missiles, aircraft or space vehicles. This US-Canadian command has its own military radars, SAM systems, US F-15 and F-16 jet intercepters and Canadian CF-18 intercepters. 

Although NORAD says they did not have time to react, this cannot be. Within the areas where these aircraft were operating, there are numerous air bases which can deploy fighters, and reach the targeted airplane within three minutes. This is especially the case around Washington, where Langley Air Base, next to the CIA headquarters, is the most famous. F-15s, the most capable intercepters in the world, are based there. 

In the air emergency that would have been declared in all four cases, a decision would have been made on whether to deploy US military aircraft. Military aircraft are routinely deployed in such situations if only to maintain air safety. 

In the case of flight AA 77, which was in its wildcat flight for no less then 40 minutes, headed for the US capital, after the successful attack on the World Trade Center, there was plenty of time to not only deploy military aircraft but to implement national security emergency plans to secure the safety of the President and the nation's capital. There would have been plenty of time to decide whether or not to shoot it down. The matter of the delayed response is so serious, it was raised to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Richard Myers, in a Senate hearing Sept. 13, who answered evcasively. 

There was an apparent collapse of emergency procedures, of the FAA, NORAD and special national security emergency procedures to secure the President. Security experts point to the impossibility of such a collapse caused by the fog generated by an unexpected attack. This collapse could only point to sabotage within the system as part of a coordinated attack on the US.

Indianapolis High Altitude Air Traffic Control Center coverage area

3) Last tracked location of Flight 77

(flight heads back to D.C. and crashes into Pentagon)

Timeline of Events

7:45 a.m. American Airlines Flight 11 leaves Boston for Los Angeles.

7:58 United Airlines Flight 175 leaves Boston for Los Angeles.

8:01 United Airlines Flight 93 leaves Newark for San Francisco.

8:10 American Airlines Flight 77 leaves Washington for Los Angeles.

8:20 Air trafÞc controllers in New England suspect Flight 11 has been hijacked.

8:40 FAA notifies NEADS (Northeast Air Defense Sector) of NORAD, the military's civil defense system, about Flight 11.

8:43 FAA notifies NEADS about Flight 175.

8:46 American Airlines Flight 11 hits the World Trade Center's north tower.

Two F-15 fighter jets from Otis Air National

Guard Base on Cape Cod, 153 miles from New

York City, are ordered to go to New York.

8:52 F-15s become airborne.

8:55 Flight 77 stops flying west and turns east.

8:56 Air traffic controllers in Indianapolis lose radar contact with Flight 77.

9:02 United Flight 175 hits the World Trade Center's south tower.

9:03 Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center halts traffic from its airports to all New York area airspace.

9:05 Flight 77 appears as an unidentified blip

on radar over West Virginia.

9:06 Order is expanded to include the entire Northeast from Washington to Cleveland. FAA's air traffic control center outside

Washington notifies all air traffic facilities nationwide of the suspected hijacking of Flight 11.

9:08 FAA orders all aircraft to leave New York area airspace and orders all New York-bound planes nationwide to stay on the ground.

9:17 New York City airports shut down.

9:24 FAA notifies NEADS about Flight 77.

9:24 Two F-16 fighter jets from Langley Air Force Base in Hampton, Va., ordered to take off for Washington.

9:26 FAA halts takeoffs nationwide. Airborne international flights told to land in Canada.

9:30 Two F-16s take off from Langley AFB.

9:37 Flight 77 hits the Pentagon.

9:45 FAA orders all planes in the air to land at the nearest airport.

9:48 Capitol and West Wing of White House evacuated.

10:03 United Flight 93 crashes 80 miles southeast of Pittsburgh.

10:15 2,000 planes have landed in the U.S. since 9:45 order was issued.

12:16 All aircraft ordered to land at 9:45 have landed.

SOURCE: Compiled from wire sources, press reports and government records

Copyright http://www.newsday.com/news/nationworld/nation/ny-uspent232380681sep23.story?coll=ny-nationalnews-print

 

10-2-6. HIJACKED AIRCRAFT

When you observe a Mode 3/A Code 7500, do the following:

NOTE -
1. Military facilities will notify the appropriate FAA ARTCC, or the host nation agency responsible for en route control, of any indication that an aircraft is being hijacked. They will also provide full cooperation with the civil agencies in the control of such aircraft.

2. En route: During narrowband radar operations, Code 7500 causes HIJK to blink in the data block.

NOTE -
Only nondiscrete CODE 7500 will be decoded as the hijack code.

a. Acknowledge and confirm receipt of Code 7500 by asking the pilot to verify it. If the aircraft is not being subjected to unlawful interference, the pilot should respond to the query by broadcasting in the clear that he is not being subjected to unlawful interference. If the reply is in the affirmative or if no reply is received, do not question the pilot further but be responsive to the aircraft requests.

PHRASEOLOGY -
(Identification) (name of facility) VERIFY SQUAWKING 7500.

NOTE -
Code 7500 is only assigned upon notification from the pilot that his aircraft is being subjected to unlawful interference. Therefore, pilots have been requested to refuse the assignment of Code 7500 in any other situation and to inform the controller accordingly.

b. Notify supervisory personnel of the situation.

c. Flight follow aircraft and use normal handoff procedures without requiring transmissions or responses by aircraft unless communications have been established by the aircraft.

d. If aircraft are dispatched to escort the hijacked aircraft, provide all possible assistance to the escort aircraft to aid in placing them in a position behind the hijacked aircraft.

NOTE -
Escort procedures are contained in FAAO 7610.4, Chapter 7.

e. To the extent possible, afford the same control service to the aircraft operating VFR observed on the hijack code.

REFERENCE -

10-2-6. HIJACKED AIRCRAFT

When you observe a Mode 3/A Code 7500, do the following:

NOTE -
1. Military facilities will notify the appropriate FAA ARTCC, or the host nation agency responsible for en route control, of any indication that an aircraft is being hijacked. They will also provide full cooperation with the civil agencies in the control of such aircraft.

2. En route: During narrowband radar operations, Code 7500 causes HIJK to blink in the data block.

NOTE -
Only nondiscrete CODE 7500 will be decoded as the hijack code.

a. Acknowledge and confirm receipt of Code 7500 by asking the pilot to verify it. If the aircraft is not being subjected to unlawful interference, the pilot should respond to the query by broadcasting in the clear that he is not being subjected to unlawful interference. If the reply is in the affirmative or if no reply is received, do not question the pilot further but be responsive to the aircraft requests.

PHRASEOLOGY -
(Identification) (name of facility) VERIFY SQUAWKING 7500.

NOTE -
Code 7500 is only assigned upon notification from the pilot that his aircraft is being subjected to unlawful interference. Therefore, pilots have been requested to refuse the assignment of Code 7500 in any other situation and to inform the controller accordingly.

b. Notify supervisory personnel of the situation.

c. Flight follow aircraft and use normal handoff procedures without requiring transmissions or responses by aircraft unless communications have been established by the aircraft.

d. If aircraft are dispatched to escort the hijacked aircraft, provide all possible assistance to the escort aircraft to aid in placing them in a position behind the hijacked aircraft.

NOTE -
Escort procedures are contained in FAAO 7610.4, Chapter 7.

e. To the extent possible, afford the same control service to the aircraft operating VFR observed on the hijack code.

REFERENCE -
Another source:

CNN: What are the cockpit procedures if you are being hijacked? Is there any way to send a secret signal to air traffic controllers?

BARR: Yes there are. There are certain phrases that the pilots are trained to use that will indicate to the air traffic controllers that a hijack is in progress Governments like to keep these procedures confidential so as not to help hijackers.

 

 

Chapter 7. ESCORT OF HIJACKED AIRCRAFT

Section 1. GENERAL

7-1-1. PURPOSE

The FAA hijack coordinator (the Director or his designate of the FAA Office of Civil Aviation Security) on duty at Washington headquarters will request the military to provide an escort aircraft for a confirmed hijacked aircraft to:

a. Assure positive flight following.

b. Report unusual observances.

c. Aid search and rescue in the event of an emergency.

7-1-2. REQUESTS FOR SERVICE

The escort service will be requested by the FAA hijack coordinator by direct contact with the National Military Command Center (NMCC).  Normally, NORAD escort aircraft will take the required action.  However, for the purpose of these procedures, the term "escort aircraft" applies to any military aircraft assigned to the escort mission.  When the military can provide escort aircraft, the NMCC will advise the FAA hijack coordinator the identification and location of the squadron tasked to provide escort aircraft.  NMCC will then authorize direct coordination between FAA and the designated military unit.  When a NORAD resource is tasked, FAA will coordinate through the appropriate SOCC/ROCC.

7-1-3. HANDLING PRIORITY

When the situation requires an expedited departure of the escort aircraft, the aircraft shall be afforded priority consideration over other departing aircraft.

7-1-4. CONTROL RESPONSIBILITIES FOR U.S. AIRSPACE

a. When hijacked aircraft is within FAA radar coverage, escort aircraft shall be controlled by the appropriate FAA facility.

b. When a hijacked aircraft is not within FAA radar coverage but within military radar coverage, escort aircraft may be controlled by the military for the escort phase only.

c. When escort aircraft are under military control, separation between the escort aircraft/hijacked aircraft and other IFR traffic is the responsibility of the FAA.  Separation shall be provided through the application of appropriate altitude reservations as required.

d. When escort aircraft is under FAA control, standard air traffic control separation shall be applied.  In no case shall any clearance or instruction to the aircraft compromise ATC standards.

e. When tanker aircraft are employed, the designated tankers and escort aircraft shall be under FAA control, and appropriate aerial refueling procedures shall apply.

7-1-5. CONTROL RESPONSIBILITIES FOR CANADIAN AIRSPACE

Escort aircraft entering Canadian airspace from the U.S. shall be transferred to NORAD control
in accordance with FAA/NORAD procedures prior to the aircraft entering Canadian airspace.  Escort aircraft entering U.S. airspace from Canada will be transferred from NORAD control in the same manner when transfer of control is effected.   When the hijacked aircraft is not within the coverage of the NORAD surveillance system in Canada, the escort mission will be discontinued.

7-1-6. AIR/GROUND COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY

Except when specifically directed otherwise by FAA headquarters, every precaution shall be taken to prevent the hijacker/s from gaining knowledge that an escort is being conducted.  When communicating with escort aircraft, ensure that transmissions are made on a different frequency from the one being used to communicate with the hijacked aircraft and are not simultaneously broadcast on a frequency which can be overheard by the hijacked aircraft.

7-1-7. WEATHER/FLIGHT SAFETY LIMITATIONS

If weather conditions or other flight safety factors make the escort mission impractical, the mission shall be terminated by the controller or the pilot, and the FAA headquarters hijack coordinator shall be advised immediately.  The pilot of the escort aircraft will keep the controller advised of adverse weather or any other hazardous conditions.  The pilot will immediately terminate the mission if radio contact with the control facility is lost, maintaining the last assigned altitude and/or radio failure procedures unless the pilot has received specific instructions to the contrary.

 

 

 

Chapter 7. ESCORT OF HIJACKED AIRCRAFT

Section 1. GENERAL
7-1-1. Purpose 7-1-5. Control Responsibilities for Canadian Airspace
7-1-2. Requests for Service 7-1-6. Air/Ground Communications Security
7-1-3. Handling Priority 7-1-7. Weather/Flight Safety Limitations
7-1-4. Control Responsibilities for U.S. Airspace

 

Section 2. ESCORT PROCEDURES
7-2-1. Facility Notification 7-2-5. Airport Limitations
7-2-2. Pilot Notification 7-2-6. Responsibilities Prior to Join-Up
7-2-3. Vectors 7-2-7. Positioning Instructions
7-2-4. Radar Requirements 7-2-8. Termination Heading

 

Section 3. REPLACEMENT/RECOVERY OF ESCORT AIRCRAFT
7-3-1. Replacement Responsibilities 7-3-3. Return-to-Base
7-3-2. Recovery Responsibilities 7-3-4. Refueling Operations

 

Section 4. FORWARDING INFORMATION
7-4-1. FAA Headquarters Requirements
7-4-2. Position Reports Within NORAD Radar Coverage
7-4-3. Position Reports Outside NORAD Radar Coverage

 

Section 5. MISSION TERMINATION
7-5-1. Termination Authority
7-5-2. Overflight Clearance

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The Day the FAA Stopped the World
TIME's aviation correspondent Sally Donnelly dissects what happened in the air that fateful day 

 

Just after nine a.m. EST, a United flight in the Western United States started hearing some odd back and forth on the radio. The pilots heard the controllers say something about a hijacking. A pilot from another plane asked ATC, "What company?", meaning what airline was involved. "Standby" came the response from ATC. Then a few seconds of suspense — and fear. United is the only airline in the U.S. that pipes the cockpit's radio transmissions through to its inflight audio system via channel nine. The flight attendants on the United plane called through the inflight phone into the cockpit to tell the pilot that a passenger had been listening on channel 9 and wanted to know what was going on.

It became horrifyingly clear moments later: controller's voices crackling into airplane cockpits across the United States were calm but the message was disturbing and unprecedented. "Every airplane listening to this frequency needs to contact your company." With those eleven words, the world's most complex — and safe — air traffic system was brought to its knees.

Thousands of pilots rapidly began dialing up the operation centers of their airlines via the airborne communication systems that allow crew to contact the ground with e-mail or voice systems. Pilots were informed that there had been terrorist attacks, were instructed to deny all access to the cockpit and get the plane down as quickly as possible. In one cockpit, a pilot checked that the door was locked. Then he made sure that the 'crash axe' that is carried in all cockpits was in place.

Routine no more

At the FAA's national command center in Herndon, Virginia, some 30 miles from Washington, the usually predictable patterns on the small, 21 inch screens, as well as the huge 10 foot screen that display the nation's air traffic control system in action would have started to go awry. By several minutes after nine, the two airline representatives that sit alongside their FAA colleagues at the Center would have heard about the terrible call that dispatchers at the American Airlines operation center near Dallas Ft Worth airport had fielded: a flight attendant on board flight 11 had called the center, via an emergency phone line, and said that a passenger was stabbing people on board. It is not clear how much information she transmitted to her shocked coworkers. Staffers in the AA op center, some veterans of the military, still others trained in disaster response, were stunned by news of the call.

 

The procedures for hijacking (or "unlawful interference" as it's officially called) are standardized. Commercial pilots would follow these procedures as a matter of routine unless prevented by incapacitation or some other circumstances.

If intruders interfere with a flight crew, the routine calls for one of the pilots to select a preset code on the aircraft's transponder. This activates an alarm on the air traffic controller's radar screen, pointing out the aircraft on the display. If at that stage the controller isn't sure the aircraft is being hijacked -- a pilot could transmit the code by accident, for example, while changing to or from an assigned transponder frequency -- the controller will transmit a standard message. He or she will say: "You were assigned code such-and-such; confirm you're squawking (the preset code)." If the pilot transmits "yes," the controller will alert the ATC system.

If after squawking the code a pilot changes it to an emergency code or uses a radio transmission to ATC that includes preset word codes," it tells controllers that the situation is desperate and the skipper is requesting armed intervention.

This, at least, is what the regulations say. What "armed intervention" might mean in practice has, until now, been anybody's guess. A decision to send fighter planes to shoot down a domestic airliner filled with vacationers or business travelers wouldn't be easy. Until Tuesday, such a scenario would have belonged to a B-grade Hollywood movie.