At some point, before the plane reached Cleveland, the
hijackers took over the plane, armed with knives and the threat of a bomb.
Around 9:30 a.m., air-traffic controllers in Cleveland heard someone in the cockpit say,
"Hey, get out of here!" according to a source close to the investigation.
Then, in what was described as a thick Arabic accent, a voice was heard that appeared to
be addressing passengers, even though it was radioed to air-traffic control.
"This is your captain," the man said. "There is a bomb on board. Remain in
your seats. We are returning to the airport."
How the hijackers overpowered the pilots remains unclear. One passenger would report in a
telephone call that two people lay on the floor in the first-class cabin, either injured
or dead. They appeared to be the pilot and co-pilot, he said, relating information from a
flight attendant. Another told a friend that two people had their throats slit but didn't
identify them. A third saw only one injured.
At least five passengers and flight attendants described the hijackers in their calls in
similar terms: three men, wearing red bandannas, one with some sort of box strapped around
his waist that he claimed was a bomb. One passenger reported that two of the hijackers
were in the cockpit and a third guarded passengers in first-class from behind a curtain.
4th hijacker not seen
None of the callers mentioned a fourth hijacker, although the FBI has identified four men
in connection with the hijacking.
Those men are Saeed Alghamdi, Ahmed Ibrahim A. Al Haznawi, Ahmed Alnami and Ziad Samir
Jarrah.
It may be that the people who made calls were unable to see the fourth hijacker. Some news
reports have suggested one may have already gained access to the cockpit, as a uniformed
guest pilot sitting in the spare jump-seat. Or, some terrorism experts suggest, he may
have played a role as a "back-up," perhaps remaining unidentified among the
other passengers or hiding in the bathroom until he was needed.
A Justice Department spokeswoman said Friday that their "best information" shows
that four were involved.
By 9:36 a.m., United Flight 93 had suddenly changed course,
according to flight path information provided by Flight Explorer, a firm that supplies
real-time radar tracking data, making a U-turn and heading back toward Washington.
Frantic calls begin
In the cabin, passengers frantically began making calls, 23 of them from the seat-back
phones alone from 9:31 to 9:53 a.m. Others passed cell phones
to people who had been strangers just minutes before.
Why so many people were able to make calls while apparently under guard by hijackers could
be that, as one passenger reported, there was no hijacker among the passengers in coach.
Some of the telephone calls were short--no more than a few rushed words of fear or love.
Lauren Grandcolas, flying home to San Rafael, Calif., from her grandmother's funeral, left
a message for her husband saying her flight had been hijacked but she was
"comfortable, for now."
Linda Gronlund and Joe Deluca, on their way to San Francisco for a vacation together, took
turns. She called her sister to say she would miss her. He called his father.
"The plane's been hijacked," he said. "I love you."
Andrew Garcia, an Air National Guard air traffic controller and plane buff, only managed
to get out his wife's name, "Dorothy," before his phone went dead.
Other passengers, though, managed to conduct fairly lengthy, even repeated conversations
during the plane's final minutes, constructing a jumbled puzzle of what was happening
inside the Boeing 757.
Deena Burnett was feeding her three daughters breakfast and watching the news in horror
when the telephone rang in her home in San Ramon, Calif.
"Are you OK?" she asked her husband, Tom, 38.
"No," he said. "I'm on the airplane and it's been hijacked."
He told his wife that the hijackers had already stabbed someone. He told her to call the
authorities, and he hung up.
When he called back, she was on the line to the FBI. She told him about the World Trade
Center, the first he knew of the attack. He paused. "Were they commercial
airplanes?" he asked.
Deena Burnett didn't think so. Cargo or private planes, she said.
"Do you know anything else about the planes?" No, she said.
"Do you know who was involved?" Again, she said no.
He told her that the man who was stabbed had died.
The hijackers are talking about running the plane into the ground, he said. Then he said
he had to go.
His third call came about 9:41 a.m., shortly after a plane had hit the Pentagon.
"OK," he said. "We're going to do something."
In his fourth and final call, just before 10 a.m., Burnett said he was sure the hijackers
didn't have a bomb, that he thought they only had knives.
"There's a group of us who are going to do something," he repeated.
Deena Burnett thought about her years of training as a flight attendant, where she was
taught to appease hijackers, to meet their demands, to stay in the background. She told
her husband to sit down. "Don't draw attention to yourself," she said.
She told him she loved him. She felt he thought he was coming home that night. This was
simply a problem that he was going to solve, as he had solved many others.
Takeover plots hatching
As Burnett talked with his wife, three other men who may have joined him in whatever plans
were being hatched made calls of their own.
Across the aisle in Seat 4D, Mark Bingham, 31, called his mother. He was so rattled that
when Alice Hoglan got on the line, her son told her, "This is Mark Bingham."
His message was brief: The plane had been hijacked by three men and he loved her.
In the rear of the plane, Jeremy Glick, also 31, a sales manager for a Web site firm and
former judo champion, called his wife from a seatback phone. He described three Middle
Eastern men brandishing knives and a red box.
His wife told him about the attacks at the World Trade Center. He tried to grasp the
hijackers' plans--to blow up the plane or fly it into a target?
The passengers had taken a vote among themselves, he said. They had decided to try to take
back the plane.
"I told him to go ahead and do it," Lyzbeth Glick said on "Good Morning
America. "I trusted his instincts, and I said, `Do what you have to do.' I knew that
I thought he could do it."
Details relayed to operator
Beamer, 32, an account manager for Oracle Corp., called a stranger. He picked up a
seat-back phone and hit "0," and at 9:45 a.m., he was connected first to a
dispatcher for GTE Airfone, and then to Lisa Jefferson, the operator's supervisor.
For 13 minutes, Beamer told Jefferson everything he could, passing along information he
gleaned himself as well as from a flight attendant. The passengers remained in their
seats, she said he told her, and the flight attendants were forced to sit in the back of
the plane.
He told her how much he loved his pregnant wife and two sons, and he asked her to call
them. He asked her to say the Lord's Prayer and 23rd Psalm with him.
Moments later, Beamer told Jefferson about the plan, that the passengers were going to run
up the long, narrow aisle to the first-class cabin and attack the hijacker there.
"I'm going to have to go out on faith," Beamer said.
He turned to someone else, and he said, "Are you ready?" Then, in the last words
Jefferson would hear from him, "OK. Let's roll."
Sandra Bradshaw, the flight attendant, also identified three hijackers when she called her
husband in Greensboro, N.C. She had been moved to the back of the plane, she said, but she
and other passengers had a plan. They were going to rush their captors; she was boiling
water to throw on them.
Another passenger, Elizabeth Wainio, also apparently talked of a plan to rush the
hijackers. In a call she made to her stepmother in Baltimore, using the cell phone lent to
her by Lauren Grandcolas, she said, "I've got to go now, Mom, they're breaking into
the cockpit," according to the mother of another passenger, who said she spoke with
family members about the call. Wainio's parents declined comment.
The accounts of these calls--if accurate--would indicate that at least four people were
somehow plotting to attack the hijackers. If Beamer's report is accurate, they were seated
in different sections of the plane, with Bingham and Burnett up front, while the others
were in the back.
It may be there were separate plans to take the plane or that somehow, amid all the
telephone calls, chaos and fear, the passengers were able to communicate with each other.
If they did, they may have known they had another pilot among them, Donald Greene, chief
executive officer of Safe Flight Instrument Corp. in New York. Greene, according to his
family, knew anything and everything about airplanes.
At about 9:54 a.m., the plane started flying erratically. In Oak Brook, Ill., Jefferson
heard screams in the background.
Flight plan changes
Two minutes later, the plane's flight plan changed. The destination airport was changed
from San Francisco International to Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport. Estimated
time of arrival: 10:28 a.m.
At nearly the same moment, from the plane's bathroom, someone called 911, repeating that
Flight 93 had been hijacked, that this was not a hoax.
Then, Marion Britton called a longtime friend, Fred Fiumano, at his New York City auto
shop.
Britton, crying, told him the plane was turning around. It was going to go down.
"Don't worry about it," Fiumano said, trying desperately to reassure her.
"They're only taking you for a ride."
He heard yelling and screaming in the background, and then the phone went dead. He tried
to call the cellular phone number back, but no one answered.
A few of the passengers expected they would win the battle. Before Lyzbeth Glick turned
over the phone to her father because she couldn't bear to listen anymore, her husband told
her, "Hang on the line. I'll be back."
At about 10:03 a.m., a black crater bloomed in the soft earth of a field 80 miles
southeast of Pittsburgh.
The wife in California, the father-in-law in New York, the operator in suburban Chicago
still held onto their phones.
They held on, waiting and hoping in the silence.
Tribune reporters Douglas Holt, Naftali Bendavid and Dan Mihalopoulos contributed to
this report.
Consultations with numerous professional pilots and security experts, regarding the
attacks of Sept. 11, have raised the following questions:
1) How could an operation of this size and sophistication, involving up to 100
individuals, possibly go undetected? Was this a colossal 'intelligence failure,' or was
the failure itself organized?
2) How were the hijackers able to overcome the entire flight crews, without one of the
pilots being able to punch a 4-digit code into the aircraft's transponder or say something
on radio, to inform the Federal Aviation Agency (FAA) of the hijacking? If the hijackers
might succeed in one case or two, it is amazing, if not unbelievable, that they could do
so in four cases. Were the pilots who took command of the planes from the beginning, the
hijackers? If so, the hijacker pilots must know the procedures used by flight crew
members, which are precise and complicated, and differ from airline to airline.
Many pilots say that a terrorist with minimal training could have conducted these
maneuvers. But, what are the chances of such success by four amateurs? The former
commander of the Israeli Air Force, Major General Eiten Ben Eliahu said, in an Israeli
radio interview, that he believed that the pilots must have been Americans, not
foreigners. The fact that the attacks had to occur during clear skies, means the operation
must have had several target dates. This adds another level of complexity.
3) Why did all emergency procedures fail? Several professional pilots have made this
point, including a recent article in the Israeli daily Ha'aretz, by its military
commentator. All four planes grossly deviated from their flight
paths. Under FAA procedures, the moment it is detected that an aircraft has
deviated from its assigned flight path, the FAA immediately tries to contact pilots. If it
fails, an emergency is declared and all air space in the area
is secured. In the course of such an emergency, procedures are followed to determine
whether the airplane was hijacked or out of control. Because the time factor is so
crucial, these emergency procedures are well defined and exercised, to be implemented as
rapidly as possible. In certain emergencies, especially hijacking, US military resources
are drawn on as a matter of routine.
It has been reported that the transponders of the aircraft were turned off. This alone
would trigger emergency procedures. Even if turned off, they would not disappear from the
radars which would continue to track the flight path.
American Airlines flight 11 and United Airlines flight 175, the two aircraft that hit the
World Trade Center, took off from Boston's Logan Airport at 7:59 and 7:58 respectively.
The former hit the World Trade Center 46 minutes later. The latter, 66 minutes later. They
both grossly deviated from their assigned flight paths, especially UA 175. Under emergency
conditions, this is a tremendous length of time.
In the case of the Pentagon attack, the facts appear even more extraordinary. American
Airlines flight 77 departed from Washington's Dulles airport for Los Angeles. It flew west
for 40 minutes, made a U-turn and started to return to Washington, and hit the Pentagon 40
minutes later, at 9:40.
United Airlines flight 93 took off from Newark Airport in New Jersey heading for San
Francisco, made a U-turn over Cleveland, Ohio and crashed in Pennsylvania.
The exact sequence of events over this almost 2-hour time-frame has not been made public,
despite press leaks.
Security sources have asked the question regarding the role of the North American
Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), which is responsible for defending US and Canadian
airspace from attack by missiles, aircraft or space vehicles. This US-Canadian command has
its own military radars, SAM systems, US F-15 and F-16 jet intercepters and Canadian CF-18
intercepters.
Although NORAD says they did not have time to react, this cannot be. Within the areas
where these aircraft were operating, there are numerous air bases which can deploy
fighters, and reach the targeted airplane within three minutes. This is especially the
case around Washington, where Langley Air Base, next to the CIA headquarters, is the most
famous. F-15s, the most capable intercepters in the world, are based there.
In the air emergency that would have been declared in all four cases, a decision would
have been made on whether to deploy US military aircraft. Military aircraft are routinely
deployed in such situations if only to maintain air safety.
In the case of flight AA 77, which was in its wildcat flight for no
less then 40 minutes, headed for the US capital, after the successful attack on the
World Trade Center, there was plenty of time to not only deploy military aircraft but to
implement national security emergency plans to secure the safety of the President and the
nation's capital. There would have been plenty of time to decide whether or not to shoot
it down. The matter of the delayed response is so serious, it was raised to Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Richard Myers, in a Senate hearing Sept. 13, who answered
evcasively.
There was an apparent collapse of emergency procedures, of the FAA, NORAD and special
national security emergency procedures to secure the President. Security experts point to
the impossibility of such a collapse caused by the fog generated by an unexpected attack.
This collapse could only point to sabotage within the system
as part of a coordinated attack on the US.
Indianapolis High Altitude Air Traffic Control Center coverage area
3) Last tracked location of Flight 77
(flight heads back to D.C. and crashes into Pentagon)
Timeline of Events
7:45 a.m. American Airlines Flight 11 leaves Boston for Los Angeles.
7:58 United Airlines Flight 175 leaves Boston for Los Angeles.
8:01 United Airlines Flight 93 leaves Newark for San Francisco.
8:10 American Airlines Flight 77 leaves Washington for Los Angeles.
8:20 Air trafÞc controllers in New England suspect Flight 11 has
been hijacked.
8:40 FAA notifies NEADS (Northeast Air Defense Sector) of
NORAD, the military's civil defense system, about Flight 11.
8:43 FAA notifies NEADS about Flight 175.
8:46 American Airlines Flight 11 hits the World Trade Center's north tower.
Two F-15 fighter jets from Otis Air National
Guard Base on Cape Cod, 153 miles from New
York City, are ordered to go to New York.
8:52 F-15s become airborne.
8:55 Flight 77 stops flying west and turns east.
8:56 Air traffic controllers in Indianapolis lose radar contact with Flight 77.
9:02 United Flight 175 hits the World Trade Center's south tower.
9:03 Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center halts traffic from its airports to all New
York area airspace.
9:05 Flight 77 appears as an unidentified blip
on radar over West Virginia.
9:06 Order is expanded to include the entire Northeast from Washington to Cleveland. FAA's
air traffic control center outside
Washington notifies all air traffic facilities nationwide of the suspected hijacking of
Flight 11.
9:08 FAA orders all aircraft to leave New York area airspace and orders all New York-bound
planes nationwide to stay on the ground.
9:17 New York City airports shut down.
9:24 FAA notifies NEADS about Flight 77.
9:24 Two F-16 fighter jets from Langley Air Force Base in Hampton, Va., ordered to take
off for Washington.
9:26 FAA halts takeoffs nationwide. Airborne international flights told to land in Canada.
9:30 Two F-16s take off from Langley AFB.
9:37 Flight 77 hits the Pentagon.
9:45 FAA orders all planes in the air to land at the nearest airport.
9:48 Capitol and West Wing of White House evacuated.
10:03 United Flight 93 crashes 80 miles southeast of Pittsburgh.
10:15 2,000 planes have landed in the U.S. since 9:45 order was issued.
12:16 All aircraft ordered to land at 9:45 have landed.
SOURCE: Compiled from wire sources, press reports and government records